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1943] NOTES AND COMMENTS
right of any other court to make its disbarment order effective
throughout the state should be based on statute; 27 this is the case in
Indiana.28
It appears then, that even if the General Assembly had given
to the circuit and superior courts the exclusive right to disbar, the
Supreme Court could still have exercised its inherent power.29
BANKRUPTCY
AGRICULTURAL COMPOSITION AND EXTENSION
Petitioner held respondents' note secured by a mortgage on their
Indiana farm. On March 4, 1939, foreclosure proceedings were insti-
tuted in a state court and a judgment was obtained on Nov. 20, 1939,
ordering the property sold to satisfy the debt. The sheriff sold the
farm on May 25, 1940, and three days later respondents filed petition
for agricultural composition and extension under the Bankruptcy Act1
listing the farm in their schedules. The sheriff's deed was executed
(1909); Ie re Strong, 27 Ohio C.A., 29 Ohio C. D. 281 (1917);
In re Dougherty, 103 W. Va. 7, 136 S.E. 402 (1927). Cf. Com-
monwealth ex rel, Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 50, 98 S.W.(2d) 53, 58 (1936).
27. See cases cited in note 26 supra.
28. A disbarment by a circuit or superior court revokes the attorney's
privilege to practice in any and all of the courts of the state.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, ]933) §4-3614.
29. Apparently only one other state, Texas, could have the same prob-
lem which confronted the Court in the instant case. See Texas
Rev. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) arts. 305, 306, 313. The Supreme Court
has control of admission to the bar, but by statutes (art. 313),
the power to disbar is given to the district courtz. The Texas
Supreme Court has not had to take original jurisdiction of a dis-
barment case, but it is said that "While the legislature has given
the district court jurisdiction of disbarment proceedings generally,
it would seem that the Supreme Court by virtue of its power to
admit to the bar would have a like power to disbar, and all other
courts of record and general jurisdiction may at least exercise
disciplinary control over those who practice before them." Green,
Court's Power over Admission and Disbarment (1925) 4 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 25. This same argument should hold true in Indiana.
1. 49 Stat. 942-945; 11 U. S. C. §203. Petition was filed under sec-
tion 75 (a-r) but we are concerned here only with a portion of
subsection (n) which provides that "The filing of a petition . . .
praying for relief under this section, shall immediately subject
the farmer and all his property . . . to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the court including . . . the equity of redemption when the
period of redemption has not or had not expired, or where a deed
of trust has been given as security, or where the sale has not
or had not been confirmed, or where deed had not been delivered,
at the time of filing the petition."
"In all cases where at the time of filing the petition, the
period of redemption has not or had not expired, or where the
right under a deed of trust has not or had not become absolute,
or where the sale has not or had not been confirmed, or where
deed had not been delivered, the period of redemption shall be
extened or the confirmation of sale withheld for the period nec-
essary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this
section."
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and delivered on June 1, 1940, and thereafter petitioner filed a motion
in the United States district court to strike the farm from the schedules
on the ground that they had no right or equity in the property, the
period of redemption having expired at the time of the sale as pro-
vided by state law.2 The court granted the motion but was reversed
by the circuit court of appeals, and petitioner applied for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court. Held, respondents' petition, filed
after the sheriff's sale, but prior to delivery of the deed, did not bring
the property under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. State
Bank of Hardinsburg v. Brown et al, 63 Sup. Ct. 128 (1942).
At first it appears that section 75 (n) permits the farmer to file
his petition for agricultural composition and extension at any time
prior to delivery of the sheriff's deed to the purchaser, and thereby
bring his property under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. His
property would include his equity of redemption which would be ex-
tended for a period necessary to carry out the provisions of the act.
This literal interpretation brings the issue in the instant case into
sharp focus since the applicable Indiana statute3 indicates clearly that
under the state law the mortgagor's equity of redemption expires
simultaneously with the sheriff's sale,4 and the delivery of the deed
is a mere ministerial duty, performance of which may be compelled by
writ of mandate.5 At the sale the purchaser acquires the equitable
interest, the mortgagor retaining only the bare legal title in trust for
him.6
Section 75 (n), literally construed, purports to revive the mort-
agor's interest in the land in contravention of state law under which
this interest had expired. Had the court adopted this construction,
they necessarily would have been compelled to consider its validity.7
Congress, under the bankruptcy power, may extend the period of re-
demption fixed by state law without violating constitutional provisions,s
but "the state law still establishes the norm to which Congress must
substantially adhere, . . . and a serious departure from this norm
has led to condemnation of the federal action as constituting a de-
privation of property without due process."9 The exercise of the bank-
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §3-1801 to §3-1809 inclusive.
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §3-1801 to §3-1809 inclusive.
4. Hubble v. Berry et al., 180 Ind. 513, 103 N.E. 328 (1913); Robert-
son et al. v. Van Cleave et al., 129 Ind. 217, 231, 29 N.E. 781
(1892).
5. State ex rel. Miller v. Bender, 102 Ind. App. 185, 1 N.E. (2d)
662 (1936); Hubble v. Berry et al., 180 Ind. 513, 103 N.E. 328
(1913) ; Jessup et al. v. Carey, 61 Ind. 584 (1878).
6. Stang v. Redden, 28 Fed. 11 (C.C.D. Kan. 1886); Bell et al. v.
Diesem et al., 86 Kan. 364, 121 Pac. 335 (1912); See 42 C. J. 247.
7. In the dissenting opinion of the instant case Mr. Justice Murphy
contended for a liberal construction to give the full measure of
relief to the mortgagor, but the question of the validity of the
section under such construction was not discussed in spite of
petitioner's argument on this point.
8. Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 516 (1938).
9. Wright v. ,Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938).
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duptcy power, as in the case of other delegated powers,10 is subject
to the requirement of the due process clause.1 But that the Court is
extremely hesitant even to consider the question of validity is evident
since it is a cardinal principle that " . . . when the validity of an act
of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of con-
stitutionality is raised . . . , this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided." 12 In the instant case the Court avoided the question by
an interpretation based upon "a fair reading of the entire section"
which appears to be fully supported by the legislative history of the
act.13
The intention of Congress was to provide " . . . a procedure to
effectuate a broad program of rehabilitation of distressed farmers
faced with the disaster of forced sales and an oppressive burden of
debt,"' 4 and at the same time to provide safeguards throughout the
proceedings for the protection of secured creditors.25 Prior to the
amendmentio to subsection (n) there were diverse rulings and hold-
ings by various federal district courts as a result of their highly dis-
similar interpretations.1' Some of the courts even refused to per-
mit the farmer to file his petition after foreclosure proceedings had
been initiated although his period of redemption had not yet expired.18
Obviously these decisions were technical and failed to carry out the
10. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146,
155 (1919); Ochoa v, Hernandez, 230 U. S. 139, 153 (1913); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, 119 (1866) (War power). Heiner
v. Donnan et al., 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932); Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U. S. 142, 147 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge et al., 274 U. S.
531, 542 (1927); Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 450(1924); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886); United
States v. Railroad Co., 84 U. S. 322 (1872) (Power to tax).
United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 326 (1917); Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401, 410 (1905); United States v.
Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 471 (1903); United States v. Joint Traffic
Assn., 171 U. S. 505, 571 (1898); Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336 (1893) (Power to regulate
commerce). Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 236(1896) (Power to exclude aliens).
11. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 589
(1935).
12. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank et al., 300 U. S.
440, 461 (1937); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1931);
See 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 338, 339.
13. See instant case at 130.
14. Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co. et al., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940);
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 (1940); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180 (1939).
15. Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co. et al., 311 U. S. 273, 278 (1940);
Borchard et al. v. California Bank et al., 310 U. S. 311, 317 (1940).
16. By act of Aug. 28, 1935, c. 792, §§2-5, 49 Stat. 942-945; 11 U. S. C.
§203.
17. See 99 A. L. R. 1390.
18. In re Borgelt, 10 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.Ill. 1935); In re Chaboya,
9 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Cal. 1934); See 99 A. L. R. 1390; Sen. Rep.
No. 985, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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congressional purpose of protecting the farmer's home and property.10
To promote uniformity and to clarify the section, Congress amended it20
Senator Borah, a member of the committee, explained the amendment
indicating clearly an intention to allow petitions to be filed "during
the period of redemption" or "during the period of moritorium pro-
vided within the state."21 The period of redemption expires in some
states when foreclosure proceedings are instituted, in others when
sale is made, in others when the sale is confirmed, and yet in others
when the deed is delivered.22 Undoubtedly the ambiguous phrasing of
the section is a result of the draftsman's endeavor to extend to the
farmer the right to file his petition during the period of redemption
in his particular state.23 This excess of caution placed the section
in jeopardy, but the Court rightly decided that a fair reading of the
entire section, supplemented by a knowledge of the legislative history,
indicates a clear intent to extend the bankruptcy jurisdiction only
over property which still remains subject to redemption under state
law at the time of filing the petition. 24
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AGRICULTURE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,1 as amended May 26, 19412
with regard to the commerce clause3 and asks that the Secretary of
Agriculture of the United States be enjoined from enforcing the mar-
keting penalty imposed by that act upon wheat grown in excess of
the 1941 marketing quota.4 From a judgment granting the injunction,5
19. Sen. Rep. No. 985, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R. Rep. No.
1808, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. 79 Cong. Rec., Pt. 15 at 15632.
22. Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) §§1695-1746; Wiltsie, Mortgage
Foreclosure (5th ed. 1939) §1199.
23. See instant case at 131 (dicta). But see Mr. Justice Murphy dis-
senting in instant case at 133 where he states " . . . If Congress
so intended its words were poorly chosen. Congress could easily
have declared that bankruptcy jurisdiction does not survive the
extinguishment of the equity of redemption under state law,. .. '
24. See instant case at 130.
1. 52 Stat. 31 (1938), as amended 7 U.S.C. §1281 et seq., 7 U.S.C.A.
§1281 et seq. (Supp. 1942).
2. 55 Stat. 203 (1941), 7 U.S.C. §1340 (Supp. No. 1), 7 U.S.C.A.
§1340 (Supp. 1942).
3. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
4. The quota provisions in the act include all wheat grown whether
for sale or for farm consumption. 54 Stat. 727 (1940), 7 U.S.C.§1301(b) (6) (A,B), 7 U.S.C.A. §1301(b) (6) (A,B) (Supp.
1942). The term "market" includes the disposal of wheat "by
feeding (in any form) to poultry or livestock which, or the pro-
ducts of which are sold, bartered, or exchanged, or to be so dis-
posed of." Ibid. The Court in the instant case 63 Sup. Ct. at 86
interprets this to mean that "penalties do not depend upon whether
any part of the wheat either within or without the quota is sold
or intended to be sold."
5. Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
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